KANT & AQUINAS:

REGARDING THE TRANSCENDENCE OF REASON.

Rob Harle © 1996

 

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) arrived at what he considered to be the definitive rational proof of the existence of God. This proof is known as the "Five Ways" and is part of his "Summa Theologiae". Aquinas' proofs are the most sophisticated version of the natural theology tradition and follow on from the ideas of Plato, Aristotle (especially) and the Neo-Platonists. The most important point regarding these "rational philosophical proofs" is that they derive from reason alone, that is, faith is not a prerequisite, both theist and atheist alike after fair consideration of them must logically believe in the existence of God (Charlesworth, (a) 1987. pp.21-23). Aquinas uses reason to go beyond reason and immediate sense experience, insisting that "we are rationally compelled to do this to give an intelligible account of the world".

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) one of the most important philosophers and leading figures of the Enlightenment period believes it is impossible to use reason to transcend reason. He, together with the rational empiricists, maintain we cannot "speak meaningfully about any realm of reality that goes beyond our human experience". The erroneous belief that it is possible to do so is known as the "transcendental illusion".

In this paper I critically discuss both these views. Firstly, I look at Aquinas' proofs, discussing them to show why he believes we must go beyond the world of experience to postulate the existence of God. I then critically discuss these proofs and show that they are not proofs at all, but at best, one possible explanation of a transcendent God. I believe it is important to show the faults in Aquinas' reasoning because this has a direct bearing on my critique of the limitations of Kant's "reasoning" philosophy. For Kant it is irrelevant whether Aquinas' proofs are correct or not, as Kant maintains that we cannot use reason to infer the existence of anything, including God, which goes beyond our human experience. Secondly, I outline Kant's basic thesis and show why he believes, I think correctly, that it is impossible to use reason to know, discuss or prove any reality beyond our empirical experience. Thirdly, I go on to critically discuss the correct use of reason showing that although Kant's logic is correct, it is not by any means the end of the matter in the search for the existence of a transcendent God.

Aquinas developed five proofs, briefly as follows: (1)The world is changeable therefore there must exist an unchanging cause of change. (2) Things in the world are related in a cause/effect way therefore there must exist an uncaused cause. (3) Things have contingent existence therefore a necessary existent must exist. (4) Things exhibit degrees of perfection therefore a wholly perfect being must exist. (5) The world exhibits design and purposiveness therefore there exists a supreme cause of the design and purposiveness of the world (Charlesworth, (a) 1987. p.24).

As can be seen each proof is similar in that an observation of material existence is made, then reason used to suppose a higher or transcendent cause of the phenomenon. Aquinas' proofs do not require faith in for example, the existence of a necessary existent, he uses logical reasoning to show that there must exist a necessary existent. Also Aquinas does not try to describe or give attributes to a transcendent entity nor does he explicitly insist, that the God he has proven must exist, is the God of Judaeo-Christianity. What he wanted to establish was the "‘condition of possibility’ of the God of the Bible" (ibid. p.24). Aquinas argues that we cannot rationally observe facts in the world, such as change, then say – "that just is the way it is" without seeking a logical reason for that change. For Aquinas this is irrational.

The First Proof regards motion or change, Aquinas argues linearly that each change is caused by a mover and that mover is in turn moved by another and so on ad infinitum. However, Aquinas does not allow this to continue to infinity or an infinite regress so assumes it must stop somewhere. That somewhere he calls God. It is worth mentioning, if only to show the universal narrowness of Aquinas' thinking, that he says "...this everyone understands to be God". Before showing the faults in Aquinas' reasoning I must point out the rather self-evident fact that for a proof of the existence of God to be at all viable it must be universally applicable. Aquinas' proofs are not at all relevant to Buddhists, to use just one example.

There are a number of problems with Aquinas' reasoning (not his logic): Firstly, as Kenny points out there is no reason to suppose that a "first mover"= God (if we follow Aquinas's reasoning), which lies outside the material universe (Kenny,1980. pp.32-33). Secondly, there is no sound logical reason to disallow change to occur ad infinitum. Thirdly, in spite of Copleston's insistence that Aquinas' thinking is "vertically hierarchical" not lineal, it is still straight line thinking (Copleston, 1987. pp.18-19). The concept of cycles or circularity seems not to have occurred to Aquinas, I find this odd as Pagan religion and medieval astrology, both prevalent in Aquinas’ time, are based upon cyclic change. Also whole systems in which feedback causes change, which in turn causes feedback, were not understood in Aquinas' time. If we understand the universe as a whole system, expanding and contracting, regulated by feedback as logically sound (or possible) then the First Proof is in no way definitive or conclusive.

Secondly, the Second Proof argues linearly: "In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes". The same objections raised regarding Proof One can be used to show the inconclusiveness of this proof. Hinduism does not suppose a first cause, so for Hindus, Aquinas' "ascension from caused to caused by, to caused by.....to a ‘first efficient cause’ is absurd. Kenny (ibid. p.44) suggests that "...the First Way starts from an indisputable fact about the world, the Second starts from an archaic fiction".

Aquinas' Third Proof argues that if a thing has the possibility to not-be, then at some stage it did not or will not exist. For Aquinas the existence of an object, say an animal, ceases to exist when it dies, this is a superficial understanding. We know quite well now, that this is only the cessation of a psycho-physical system not the primary matter, this merely changes into different systems. Aquinas was well aware of the "actualities" and "potentialities" of objects and that they change substantially. But this is not at all the same thing as ceasing to exist. For the proof to be valid the primary matter would have to at some stage not exist. "Several of the Five Ways seem to depend on antiquated physics, and none of them has yet been restated in a way clear of fallacy" (Speake, 1988. p.19).

The Fourth Proof involves too many subjective value assumptions; "goodness, noblest", conjoined with physical facts, "hotter to hottest" to be able to infer a "wholly perfect being".

In the Fifth Proof Aquinas assumes, the argument of design to be true, that things move towards an end by design. A sandstone cliff is eroded by sun, wind and water, the sand washes up on a beach forming a sand dune in which a plant grows, there is no pre-determined design or end, simply an endless cycle. This simple example highlights one of the most important factors of the teleological argument, if a designer is responsible for the universe, at what stage does the design stop and chance take over? The design, hence designer argument, is fraught with difficulties and is in no way conclusive of God's existence. I do acknowledge however, that the teleological debate is perhaps one of the most intractable in religious philosophy. I do not wish to go into further detail in showing the problems with Aquinas' proofs, as the relevance of their inconclusiveness is only secondary to the main purpose of this paper.

Kant argues that we cannot use reason, that is, pure reason, to venture beyond the world we know through direct experience. If God is thought to transcend the world of sense experience then we cannot use reason to attempt to prove or describe this God. To understand Kant's, "Critique of Pure Reason" it is important to establish what he means by certain terms. He uses intuition to mean; our direct experience of the world, intuition provides the actual content of experience. He uses understanding to mean; our interpretation of our experiences of the world, understanding provides the categories of experience. All knowledge for Kant is a union of these two (Hutchings, 1987. pp.35-37). Categorical ideas cannot be used to go beyond intuition, in Kant's own words:

Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding (Kant (b), 1929. p93).

The key concept in this paper, whereby Kant believes Aquinas' reasoning mode to be illegitimate, and hence his proof of the existence of God invalid, is known as the transcendental illusion. Kant explains that this tendency by humans to go beyond sensibility is natural and only by realising the limits of reason, the purpose of his Critique, can we avoid falling under the spell of this illusion.

Human reason has this peculiar fate that...it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer (Kant (b), 1929. p.7)

Kant shows that understanding itself does not cause the problem, it is reason that erroneously reasons understanding into the illusory transcendental realm.

Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles. Accordingly, reason never applies itself directly to experience or to any object...(Kant (b), 1929. p303).

Kant distinguishes between two types of propositions; synthetic and analytic. Synthetic a priori propositions increase our knowledge. Analytic propositions analyse existing knowledge but do not increase it. In searching for answers to questions about reality and how we come to know things, Kant rephrased; "What is reality like?" to "Why do we see reality as we do?" He shifted the emphasis from believing scientific knowledge comes from outside (that is, from reality itself) to a priori structures inside humans which we project outwards. A priori structures Kant calls categories and they correctly belong to understanding (Hutchings, 1987. p.38).

This was a major paradigmatic shift in Western philosophical thinking, Kant himself called it a Copernican revolution in philosophy (Walsh, 1970. p. 392). This approach to reality is a basic part of much Eastern-Oriental thinking both now and in Kant's time. The projection of categories on experience is similar to believing the real world is blue if we were wearing blue spectacles, which we were unaware of. This famous metaphor shows "the blue of the world is not the worlds, but ours". Kant insists experience can never be other than sensible. We cannot intuit, non-sensible things. Therefore if we have no direct sense experience of God or of a "First Cause" we cannot prove they exist or speak meaningfully about them. Kant believes we cannot even ask such questions as, "What is the cause of everything?", for in so doing, "we are extending the category of causality beyond any possible sense experience". The result is non-sense.

In, "On the failure of all attempted philosophical Theodicies", Kant attempts to show that "theodicy is not a task of science but is a matter of faith". The authentic theodicy exists after we have realised the powerlessness of reason (Kant (a) p.75). Kant distinguishes between pure reason and practical reason. Pure reason as previously discussed cannot go beyond experience therefore cannot talk about the existence of God. It also cannot be used to show that God does not exist, for the same limitations of reason. One may argue from the position that no human has had a direct sense experience of God, that is God as object, therefore we can say God does not exist. However this does not hold, simply because no one has had an experience of God (which is debatable - I discuss this in the latter part of this essay) it does not mean that it is impossible or will not happen in the future.

Kant proposes for ethical purposes; "…we may accede to an idea of God which, on the side of speculative reason, is less than satisfactory, but which will do to provide a Providence to match happiness to goodness and so on". We need God to guarantee justice and morality in the universe (Hutchings,1897. p.53). Kant's association of "God becoming meaningful to us only through morality" and religion being concerned with practical not speculative reason is I contend, highly problematic, as is, Kant's discussion throughout most of; "On the failure of all attempted philosophical theodocies", particularly the section dealing with sincerity, evil and suffering in the world and justice of the universal judge. Despite Kant's understanding of projection, he seems to have had no idea of repressed-unconscious human drives and the part they play in sincerity and seems also to have a very limited world experience of suffering and evil.

To equate goodness with God is purely an assumption, which has been perpetuated throughout Christianity, it is just as valid or logically possible to assume that God = absolute evil and has created the worst of all possible worlds to perpetuate evil. Kant's descent into speculation on morality = goodness = ultimate happiness shows his limitations and is quite remarkable considering the brilliance of the "Critique of Pure Reason". I speculate that this was the result of his Christian, Lutheran background from which he could not think independently.

This criticism is not directly related to our topic; "..whether reason can or cannot be used to go beyond human experience to establish the existence of God", so I will mention it briefly further on and keep the goodness = God problem for a future essay.

The problem of proving the existence of God, immortality and similar transcendent possibilities can be divided into four categories: Ontological, Cosmological, Teleological and From Contingency. Aquinas' proofs of these categories as previously discussed, prior to the Kantian critique, are not at all conclusive or definitive. The logic in his reasoning is acceptable but the premises he reasons from are open to criticism and alternative premises, lineal versus cyclic as one example. Though his proofs are not conclusive they still remain one possible coherent explanation. However, when we apply Kant's criticism of the limitations of theoretical reasoning we find Aquinas in a double-bind; not only are his proofs inconclusive but meaningless.

All attempts to prove the existence of God, either ‘cosmologically’ by way of the principle of causality, or ‘ontologically’ by analysis of the concept of God, are therefore rejected by Kant since they inevitably involve either the fallacy of taking the world as a totality or whole which requires explanation for its existence or they involve the illicit transition from the conceptual to the real order (Charlesworth, (b) 1972. p.109).

Aquinas insists we are, "rationally compelled to go beyond the world of our immediate experience in order to give an intelligible account of that world". Aquinas would be correct if we rephrase the question to; "we are rationally compelled to ‘speculate on possibilities’ beyond immediate experience in order to then test immediate experience to make the world intelligible".

Humans find themselves with a faculty ‘apparently’ superior to animals and plants in that we can reason about existence; ask questions such as; "What is the cause of existence?", "Why do the planets behave as they do?" If we had never asked such questions it would be that we did not have the cerebral hemisphere capacity to do so, in other words we would be similar to the animals. Humans by their nature are compelled to ask questions beyond their present knowledge, beyond their immediate sense experience and speculate what might be, to plot our very survival (or demise). In Kant's time the knowledge of the molecular structure of DNA was non-existent; in a sense as far away from our realisation as the knowledge of a God. If we had not dared to ask questions about reproduction we would not have this knowledge. However, when we arrive at answers some are demonstrable proofs (within our existing paradigms), others are speculative possibilities (hypotheses). Aquinas' are neither. If Aquinas asked the question; "What created the universe?" and imagined the creator as a sphere of energy this would be permissible. What is not permissible is to reason from mundane (particular) to transcendent (whole). Kant insists we can have no experience of the world (universe) as a whole so cannot reason about it at all.

If it is part of our nature to ask questions, so it is also part of our nature to be irrational. This may be hard to admit but killing other humans because they have faith in a different concept of God or dumping sewerage in the ocean where you swim is highly irrational. When people fall in love they often become so irrational their own well being is compromised. Kant of course recognised this irrationality and the human error of believing reason capable of answering all questions and thus wrote his Critique to warn us of the dangers. Zen had been warning people of these same dangers hundreds of years before Kant. Like Zen Buddhists, empiricists recognise only that knowledge which comes from direct experience. Theoretical speculation of realities beyond our experience are seen as meaningless. Kant holds to this view for Pure Reason but not for Practical Reason.

What constitutes direct sense experience requires clarification. Humans cannot, as an example, have direct experience of radio waves in our natural biological state, so to reason from; "my voice travels through air to another's ear" to, "there must be higher frequency communications possible" is of the same order of reasoning that Kant disallows. Surely this is speaking about a realm of reality that goes beyond human experience. However; imaginative, inventive humans like Marconi speculated that such was possible and starting from "particular world experience" invented an apparatus (wireless) which is an extension of our senses which allows us to experience what before the invention was a non-existent beyond our immediate possible experience.

Is it possible to use this analogy in the discussion about the existence of God?. I believe so. We certainly cannot use theoretical reason to provide proof of God as Kant has been at pains to point out. So this raises the question; Is it possible to have a direct experience of God? Can we build an apparatus which will allow us this privilege, or is it within our "natural sense capabilities" to do this? Mystics of all traditions believe that it is possible to have direct experience of God, the testimonies and accounts of these experiences are vast (James, Happold). If this is possible we are no longer guessing as it were about a reality beyond direct experience but can actually speak about it meaningfully; within the limitations of language, symbolism and so on to be sure, but it is no longer meaningless speculation. Corless calls this faculty with which we have these experiences the super-consciousness (Corless, 1986. pp.115-136). Empiricists, especially logical positivists, do not allow this mystical evidence as proof of God because it is subjective and cannot be replicated in controlled experiments (to date) as a valid scientific theory and also cannot be falsified.

The only way I can see that the age old question of God's existence can be further explored, is by investigating the direct experience claims of mystics thoroughly, with correct methodology and on a large scale. The object of the investigation would be of course to prove that mystical experiences are direct experiences of God and not psychological mental states, contextually dependent. Failing this monumental, perhaps impossible task, we will be left with the inability to prove God's existence using pure reason and will have to rely on faith alone. If mystical experience is non-valid for empiricists then faith is even more so, being no more than an emotional desire to fulfil a psychological need. Not so for Kant. He attempts to give faith almost the respectability of scientific reason. He does so by arguing that faith is not blind faith but faith deriving from practical reason. Kant believes it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.

Kant emphasises that the existence of God is not the condition of morality or obligation as such, but of morality in so far as it is concerned with bringing about the highest good (Charlesworth, (b) 1972. p.119).

Kant is saying, "Reason finds itself constrained to assume" the existence of God "otherwise it would have to regard the moral laws as empty figments of the brain..." (ibid. p.120). Kant cannot allow himself or perhaps it never occurred to him that moral laws may actually be "empty figments of the brain". To put it in a more modern way, moral laws may be mental constructs, developed over millennia to help ensure our biological survival. If we look to nature we see pecking orders and other survival strategies these are not moral laws. There are no moral laws governing cyclones and earthquakes, as the famous Zen saying by Dogen goes; "The wind blows, branches bend, the flowers are scattered, but the wind has never had any ill will, nor do the trees harbour any feeling of enmity". Moral laws come only from humans and are projected irrationally onto the rest of existence.

Kant has created a paradox by introducing the concept of practical reason over and above speculative reason. As Charlesworth points out Kant wants to; "have his cake and eat it too". Either the knowledge of God's existence is in speculative mode or is in the practical mode. It cannot be both; it cannot be in speculative mode, as this would involve Kant in an outright contradiction; and it cannot be in practical mode, for as Kant says himself: "Practical reason cannot tell us what is or what exists or make truth claims" (ibid. p.123).

It is my contention that Kant's faith is blind faith and that he in no way proves that faith is otherwise by attempting to wrap it up in moral laws and practical reason. Kant has argued himself into an impasse by trying to infer knowledge of God's existence through practical reason.

The concept of God must either be logically possible or meaningful, or logically impossible or meaningless, and if it is to be logically possible...then, to that extent we must have some speculative knowledge of it (ibid. p.126).

However, as we have seen Kant does not allow speculative knowledge of God.

In summing up it seems that neither of these great thinkers, Aquinas nor Kant has given us any proof of the existence of God or the immortality of the soul. Kant has shown that we can neither assert that, "God exists" nor that "God does not exist" because reason cannot legitimately be used to go beyond the world of direct experience. Aquinas' proofs, even if we disallow Kant's critique of reason (and to do so seems logically incoherent to me) are not conclusive proofs but merely one possible hypothesis of God's existence. Kant's practical reasoning from moral necessity is highly problematic and even if it can be shown to be sound (which I would again find logically incoherent) it only allows for the assumption that God exists, it does not (and can not) prove God actually exists.

Aquinas wanted a priori to prove God's existence by reason to vindicate his faith and allegiance to the Catholic Church, if he could do this then all humans would have to accept God's existence. It would then only be a simple matter to convince the people that that God was the God of Christianity.

Similarly Kant was a man of religious faith and I believe wanted desperately to justify that faith. He lived in the time when scientific reason (empiricism) was beginning to throw doubt on religion and so a priori set out to confirm the existence of God. He could only do this and remain philosophically and scientifically respectable by adding the moral-practical reason philosophy to his speculative or negative philosophy.

Only by approaching the subject of God's existence without a priori or vested interests and within the widest possible terms of reference, vis-à-vis all major and minor world religions and the direct experiences of God from the reports of mystics and allowing subjective proof the credence it deserves will we be able to gain some definitive insight into the mystery of the existence of God.

 

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