CYBORGS:

UPLOADING & IMMORTALITY

Some Serious Concerns

Rob Harle © 2001

Whilst many Extropian concepts seem to promise benefits both to individuals and society, there has been little serious critical appraisal of this fairly recent ‘movement’. This paper is not a critique of Extropianism per se and does not discuss the profound ethical issues the practical application of the philosophy raises. The following is a discussion of two aspects of Extropianism which appear highly problematic both from a pragmatic and philosophical perspective, they are, ‘Uploading’ and ‘Immortality’.

Firstly, I will give a brief overview of Extropianism so as to ground those not familiar with its philosophy. The following brief description is from, The Extropian Principles. Ver. 3. A Transhuman Declaration.1 Moore defines Extropy as; "the extent of a system’s intelligence, information, order, vitality, and capacity for improvement".2 The ‘capacity for improvement’ is a key factor in Extropian thinking, especially the improvement of humans with the aid of science and technology. Extropians acknowledge no limits to the now possible, ‘deterministic’ evolution of humans to cyborgs to transhumans to ………..?

Like Existentialism, Extropianism tends not to have a doctrine nor a dogmatic set of rules with which to control, enslave and manipulate others. Extropianism is for ‘free spirits’, I use the word spirit metaphorically not literally, because Extropians do not recognise nor will they be subjected to any belief system, particularly ones which rely on imaginary transcendent fictions, such as religions, mysticism and occultism. Any "dogmas" that, "cannot survive scientific or philosophical criticism"3 are of no use to Extropians.

Humans are seen as a transitory stage in the evolutionary development of intelligence and as such any scientific means, from genetic engineering to neural implantation to transferring the entire contents of the brain to a different, more flexible medium (Uploading) are to be explored and encouraged.

Extropians also will not accept the current inevitability of aging and death and will not accept the natural limits imposed by, especially, our biological heritage. There are seven main principles which are listed and described in detail in the Extropian Transhuman Declaration, these are: (1) Perpetual Progress, (2) Self-transformation, (3) Practical Optimism, (4) Intelligent Technology, (5) Open Society, (6) Self-direction, (7) Rational Thinking. Those readers with more than a passing interest in the future of humanity are encouraged to read the transhuman declaration in its entirety, however, I believe this brief introduction is sufficient to now discuss the Extropian concepts of Uploading and Immortality.

One of the perhaps most radical and optimistic aims of Extropianism is to Upload the entire contents of an individual’s brain to either a robotic type body, a permanently on-line super computer or similar computational medium. For our present discussion it is sufficient to assume that this process is actually possible. Whilst I find the practical difficulties, even at the level of nano-technology virtually insurmountable I will not argue from this position. The literature is replete with examples of those who have stated, "such and such could never happen", two examples will suffice. "The telephone has too many shortcomings to be seriously considered as a means of communication" (Western Union executive, 1876). "I think there is a world market for maybe five computers" (IBM Chairman Thomas Watson, 1943).4

My main argument against Uploading is that I believe disembodied consciousness is an impossibility, this will be discussed in detail further on. After successfully Uploading the contents of Harold Citizen’s brain, and we will assume that Harold’s old human brain and body was destroyed in the process, Harold has committed suicide as a human being, specifically because he no longer has a human mind-body. Human Harold was just destroyed, not because it was necessary to do so for practical scientific reasons but to sidestep the philosophical discussion of two Harolds existing simultaneously. This prospect has been discussed extensively by Dennett.5 It will become obvious shortly, that even if human Harold was not destroyed at the time of Upload, two similar Harolds cannot exist anyway.

Current research findings in neurophysiology,6 artificial intelligence7 and developmental psychology8 support my contention that the so called, ‘mind-body problem’ is a myth. This is not the place to go into detail regarding these fields of investigation, the endnotes will point the reader in the direction of the relevant research results. This research has shown just how wrong Descartes (and Plato) were when they bifurcated humanity. Even so, as Clark points out, "It [fundamental mind-matter separation] persists in the way we study brain and mind, excluding as "peripheral" the roles of the rest of the body and the local environment. It persists in the lack of attention to the ways the body and local environment are literally built into the processing loops that result in intelligent action.9

I’ll try to give a brief definition of three aspects of our existence (brain, mind and consciousness) which are contentious and highly relevant to the Uploading problem, I am fully aware of the boldness of this venture. The brain is of course an organ in the body, it is largely, though not solely, responsible for thinking, feeling and keeping the body in a state of homeostasis.10 Its complexity is astonishing and we do not yet fully understand various aspects of the brain’s functions, especially long term memory encoding and the role of emotions in memory encoding and the development of our unique personalities.11 The more physically complex the brain, especially the cerebral cortex, its massive size evident in humans (and elephants, dolphins and the primates), the greater capacity it seems for consciousness to arise; the capability for awareness of self to occur; and the ability to act with ‘Intentionality’.

The brain is not the mind and not the repository of consciousness. One essential feature of the brain is the "feedback loops" which interact with the rest of the body (internal) and the environment remote from the body via the senses (external). From the earliest period in an entities life and development, the mapping of the body, both its existence in space and the interrelationship of its constituent parts, occurs continuously. This can be divided, for discussion purposes at least, into a cellular (molecular) level and a higher more complex level such as an entire organ. If say, an entire finger is amputated, there ceases to be feedback, however, the brain still has an encoded memory map of the finger in its state at the time, immediately prior to amputation (phantom limb sensation?). This phenomenon is of the greatest importance to the Upload problem and will be considered again further on.

Just as internal feedback between the brain and the body that supports it is necessary to maintain homeostasis, so too is feedback from the external environment. It is essential for survival of an entity to know its physical (at minimum) relationship to other entities and objects, this information reaches the brain and body via the sensory organs. Sensory deprivation, either from drug or isolation causes, brings about significant changes in the brain’s chemistry with resultant abnormal behaviour which is generally detrimental to the entity’s survival.12 Whilst external feedback, of the physical kind, is essential for survival so too is the socialisation of the developing entity, this is now being fully appreciated by artificial intelligence researchers, without socialisation anything approaching human intelligence is not possible.13

This brings us to a discussion of just what constitutes the mind. Hobson argues that the mind is not something separate or isolated from the entity but that, "the brain-mind constitutes a unified system, inextricably linked".14 I would take this further and suggest that the human mind is; all that a person is literally; feelings, memories, consciousness (variously, in all its modes), the body (with all its pains) and the external environment (only that which the entity has experienced). So, if I am talking to Harold, Harold is part of my mind; his words, gestures, appearance, everything that is communicated (experienced) between us and remains encoded in my brain-body system constitutes part of my mind. This is more or less saying the same thing as Hobson that the mind, "…is simply all the information in the brain".15

As I have shown in the previous section on the brain, a functioning brain is not separable from the body. Hence the mind-brain-body is a unified system. To be sure bits can be removed from this system (up to a limit) and it will continue to function but not exactly as before the bits were removed. If we removed poor old Harold’s legs instantly, the next instant Harold’s mind would be slightly different than before the amputation. Slightly, because the brain would be attempting through the brain-body feedback mechanism to match its existing encoded map of the legs. In time, the brain would construct a new map of the body, sans legs, and as a consequence, Harold’s mind would be considerably different from the pre-amputation mind at a fundamental level. Harold’s mind would be further changed by all the psychological and socialisation external input/outputs that go with no longer being able to walk unaided.

Mind is sometimes used synonymously with the self, now obviously the self that you were at five years of age is not the same self at age forty, it is the illusion created by the passing of time that tricks us into thinking we are the same self. Just as our self changes, moment to moment, so too our mind, even without major trauma such as amputation.

This brings me to perhaps one of the most hotly debated and illusive qualities of our being, consciousness. Consciousness is a state of mentation at any particular instant and arises from a functioning, mind-brain-body system. No functioning system, no consciousness. This of course does not mean that any functioning system, a normal computer for example, displays evidence of consciousness. As an aside, my approach to the understanding of consciousness is basically a Western scientific approach. It is also an appropriate one for the present discussion, as this is the method of Extropians, and coincidentally happens to be my own personal one as well. I am fully aware that an Eastern discussion of consciousness would start from the premise, simply stated, that consciousness exists and material bodies are a manifestation emerging out of this universal consciousness. If we were to adopt this approach the Extropian concept of Uploading would appear even more absurd than I will show it to be.

If the mind is, ‘all the information in the brain-body’, which is mostly nonconscious most of the time, Hobson believes consciousness is, "…the brain’s awareness of some of this information.16 How this awareness arises seems to be directly related to the brain’s chemical see-saw known as the aminergic-cholinergic system.17 The aminergic system (amines) governs our waking state and the cholinergic (acetylcholine) system governs our dreaming state. These systems are in dynamic equilibrium and neither one is ever totally inactive. The ratio of these chemicals can now account for many previously mysterious states of consciousness such as hypnosis, dementia and fantasy. As we approach sleep the cholinergic chemical increases and maintains dominance whilst asleep. As we wake up, normally, the reverse happens and the aminergic system becomes dominant. If we are awoken suddenly we temporarily experience confusion and disorientation because the chemical system needs a little time to re-establish its correct ratio/balance for the respective, consciously desired? states.18

Independently of Hobson’s empirical research Gelernter described consciousness as existing on a kind of linear spectrum. He believes mental focus moves from high to low, at the high focus end we are most alert, logical and deal with step-by-step problem solving. At the low focus end, that is, as we move down the spectrum we do not think logically, our minds move easily from one unrelated subject to another, creative solutions to problems occur at this level, ones that have previously defied logical solution. It is at this level that inspiration suddenly hits us. Further down the spectrum the onset of sleep and then dreaming occurs.19 We must bear in mind that during REM sleep we dream, the awareness of these dreams or dream fragments, even though we are asleep, is still part of a conscious state (one mode of consciousness). This description of mental states fits in perfectly with the action of the aminergic-cholinergic system.

One further aspect of consciousness which is relevant to Uploading is, for an agent to be considered conscious it must display Intentionality. As Searle points out this does not mean that intentionality is consciousness. "Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world".20 Intentionality needs to be divided into ‘intrinsic’ and ‘as-if’ intentionality for clarification and for consideration in the case of a non-human or transhuman entity.

If a person makes a statement such as, "I am afraid of snakes", this is an example of intrinsic intentionality. If your personal computer displays a message, ‘I am afraid of snakes’ this is, as-if intentionality. Many devices display as-if intentionality, a thermostat is a good example, but none of these devices ‘so far’ have the presence of any mental phenomena. If an office thermostat controlling the air conditioning had a speaker attached and always reported when it was turning up the heating and then one day said, "I’m not turning up the heating today because I‘ve had it with you humans treating me like a dumb object!", then it may be displaying intrinsic intentionality. For an entity to be considered consciously aware that it exists, it must possess intrinsic intentionality. Deciding between, as-if and intrinsic intentionality, will be one criterion for assessing, by traditional humans, the quality of consciousness in transhuman entities.

Extropians may object to the above statement and explain that the whole purpose of Extropianism is to evolve, especially by expanding existing levels of human consciousness, intelligence and so on. So, how can an entity (human) from its inferior? position, judge the attributes of an entity that has become superior in the very area that the assessment concerns? This raises a very real problem for conventional humans, now and in the future, not because of an Uploaded brain becoming a smart entity, but because of the same problem that would occur should aliens, significantly more evolved than us, visit earth or through the gradual transformation from human to cyborg, with the aid of technology such as bionic limbs, genetic engineering and neural implants. This gradual process means the cyborg’s brain will have time to map and re-map its new attributes and still remain a unified, brain-mind-body system. This is an entirely different proposition than the absurd notion of Uploading the entire contents of the conventional biological brain to a new medium, sans body, in one go.

Dreyfus, whilst not explicitly discussing ‘the mapping of the body by the brain’ argued some thirty years ago that a ‘body’ is an essential attribute for intelligent behaviour to occur. His research was primarily to do with artificial intelligence and it seems his thesis was correct.21 Even if my brief and somewhat simplified descriptions of the brain and mind are wide of the mark, the fact still remains that the brain and body are intimately linked and a significant part of the brain’s function is dealing with the body.

A brief word about cyborgs might be in order for those who are not familiar with this fairly recent phenomenon. Cyborg refers to an entity that is a combination of conventional biological (organic) and inorganic attributes. Whilst cyborg has been used in popular films and fiction works it has also spawned legitimate academic discourse. The addition of inorganic attributes may be divided into ‘add-ons’ and ‘implants’, add-ons could be anything from false teeth to an artificial (removable) leg, implants are such devices as Pacemakers and neural electronic brain ‘chips’ (for Parkinson’s Disease).22 Consequently there are many cyborgs currently existing in the world, the difference between a human with a Pacemaker, and a fully bionic, ‘silicone-chip-enhanced’ brain entity, is perhaps? only one of degree.

The most serious problem for Uploader protagonists is that without the body, how would the new, lets say silicone brain, function? Could it function? Obviously nobody knows the answer to this question, however, the previous discussion showing the unification of the human brain-mind-body, suggests that the new brain will not be able to function correctly, if at all. Drawing on neurophysiological findings of brain damaged patients, it seems the new silicone brain would be a chaotic mass of electrical impulses with ‘nowhere to go’ as it were. Even the slightest damage to the human brain can cause for example, epileptic seizures, with their attendant unconsciousness, rampant electrical conductivity, and total lack of control of the body. Suddenly, the new silicone brain would have no bodily feedback to match up with its existent maps, remember it is constantly trying to maintain homeostasis. Also remember, we are not talking about Uploading a few memories or perhaps a language capability and we are not just removing a leg from the brain’s landscape, but the entire landscape. Every cell, including all the hormones and chemicals which maintain the delicate balance of electrical conductivity in the "meat" brain, including the brain’s own matrix would be suddenly inaccessible! Although the new brain would not need chemical messengers (presumably) it will still attempt to function electrically at a fundamental molecular level, whether it be silicone, Rotaxane or some yet to be created molecular structure. 23

Kurzweil argues that the evolutionary change from humans to transhumans will happen gradually, "…porting our brains to new computational mechanisms will not happen all at once. We will enhance our brains gradually through direct connection with machine intelligence until such time as the essence of our thinking has fully migrated to the far more capable and reliable new machinery.23 If we are enhancing our own brains, this means the brain is still in the body (partly cyborgian perhaps) and as such would be interacting with that body, again the brain-body is a unified system and consequently the same Uploading problems exist. When the, "essence of our thinking" actually migrates, what will migrate? Memories, data, feelings, emotions? "Until such time as the essence of our thinking", What is the essence of our thinking? Electrical impulses? Emotional neurotransmitters? Molecular logic gates? Algorithms of repressed anxieties? Until we can answer this fundamental question, clearly and definitively, exactly what it is that is going to be Uploaded, how can we talk coherently of steps beyond this? It’s an amazing speculation to state that these machines (transhuman entities) which do not exist yet, will be far more capable and reliable than the human brain for thinking. The human brain, if it has any unique quality at all, is that it has evolved to be the best possible brain, all-round, for being a human being on this planet.

A personal computer at present can do many tasks faster and better than a human, but the very best robotic device cannot successfully complete even the simplest tasks that a four year old child can do perfectly, such as moving quickly around a cluttered room without crashing into objects or recognising subtle expressions on the faces of other children. This stagnation of progress in artificial intelligence research, in these areas of unique human and animal abilities is an embarrassment to the stalwarts, particularly of classical artificial intelligence (the computationalists) who predicted such abilities would be realised years ago.25 This lack of progress also caused the more liberal connectionist researchers to seriously reassess the whole concept of an intelligent agent functioning in a real ‘predatory’ environment.26 It is possible these ‘real world’ problems will eventually be overcome, however, the point is that given the present intractability of these problems it seems naive and unscientific (scientific rigor is the benchmark of Extropians) to extrapolate from clever number crunching machines to machines more capable and reliable than humans and state this will happen.

One extension of Uploading a human, or part-human part-cyborg brain, is the possibility of Immortality. Extropians fantasise about becoming immortal; changing and evolving continually; and moving out to colonise the universe, once they are rid of the limitations of our present corporeal bodies. For the purpose of the following discussion I will assume that the practical technological difficulties of transferring the contents of a human brain to a more flexible computational medium have been overcome. We may imagine that the mind-body unity problem has been solved, perhaps by transferring selected brain content, a bit like copy and paste in a word processing program. As an example, perhaps language and language capabilities of a brain could be edited out and Uploaded. If this became possible and a continuity of mind (self) was then maintained after the Upload, the new entity, though considerably different, and at first limited compared to the old brain, may be in a position for the first time, to become immortal.

Remember I am discussing this issue from an Extropian perspective, and Extropians do not give any credence to religious, mystical or occult beliefs, other than their cultural power to confuse and deceive people. Consequently the Christian concept of an immortal soul, the Hindu concept of reincarnation and beliefs in spirit-astral bodies and such other trans-material entities are simply irrelevant. Again as an aside, the concept of immortality from an Eastern perspective raises some complex problems, especially concerning the Ego. Most Eastern philosophical traditions have a spiritual component and as such see the ego (and the ‘self’ in some traditions) as illusory, so would charge the Extropian with attempting to make something immortal which does not in fact even exist.

The inevitability of death and bodily dissolution for humans is perhaps the main driving force behind the establishment of religions and spiritual belief systems. All religious movements consider eschatological possibilities to be of primary importance. None of these notions of immortality can be proven scientifically, and for some philosophers not even discussed logically, therefore the various beliefs in an afterlife, or surviving bodily death have rested on faith alone. For the first time in the history of humanity, immortality has become a real possibility, not a desperate (perhaps understandably) hope based on irrational faith. Whilst the voluminous literature, both religious and philosophical, remains relevant to any discussion of immortality the scientific possibility of, ‘a continuing coherent entity’ living for ever affects these past investigations in a subtle way.

If we imagine the new brain similar to the hard-drive, together with a huge amount of RAM, in a present computer and its body the various peripheral devices (and it would certainly be nowhere as crude as this) the new brain would still of course be subject to destruction and dissolution. This privilege (curse?) of immortality would of course be at the behest of those who maintain the new brain-medium and associated machine/cyborg body. Even if the brain was permanently on-line in a vast network and sufficiently enmeshed to not be in one location, the network, in fact the world (galaxy, universe) is still subject to dissolution.

Everything we observe is subject to change and eventually death and dissolution; from trees, to animals, to steel, to the Sun. It seems incredible that humans have allowed only two things in the universe; variations of an unchanging supreme deity (God, Brahman and so on) and humans, with the privilege of immortality. Perhaps prior to our knowledge of physics, objects such as the sun and stars were thought to be immortal, therefore, if the sun, why not some fictitious God or gods. Further, if humans were like God (anthropomorphic) as in some religions, then in addition to quelling the terror of the realisation and observation of a strictly finite, bodily existence, humans concluded that humans must have an immortal essence as well (God-like). We now know that the sun has a very limited life span (in evolutionary terms) and that even the universe itself is not a static, unchanging entity, so it seems there is nothing we can observe or experience that does not come into being, exist, then cease to exist, in its original form. With this knowledge it seems absurd to me to believe in or think possible that an entity can be immortal without change.

So, perhaps our new silicone brain-mind can become immortal, as long as someone(thing?) looks after its physical well being of course, and as long at it changes gradually, just the way a human baby changes into an adult. The one factor essential to the ‘changing into immortality’ process is that a minimum of memory (continuity) is tracked and ‘enabled’ in each successive Upload, from copy to copy as it were. Without this continuity, with no memory at all forever of the past, an entity may exist physically, in say, a silicone matrix structure but would have no relationship to the original entity. Therefore the prospect of immortality in this case is negated and the human that Uploaded has effectively suicided.

We come now to the serious problems associated with immortality for; an entity with continuity of memory, ability to change, and one protected with a fail-safe non destructive survival mechanism. Existentialism shares some common principles with Extropianism; specifically, the embrace of radical freedom, individual self-determination and acting authentically both in respect of oneself and Others, this includes accepting responsibility entirely for these actions. Because of these correlations, particularly individual determinism, I will discuss the Extropian immortality question from an Existentialist position.

Cooper raises two issues that confront the human contemplating immortality. (1) Once dead, a person can no longer defend his or her past actions, so this makes ‘life’ choices, vitally important. (2) Finitude is necessary for freedom and individuality.27 Once immortal an entity will always ‘be around’ to defend past decisions and actions. Death as it were, ‘carves the individuals past life in stone’, if Others then perceive that individual as having lived or acted in ‘bad faith’ for example, the individual can do nothing about it. True, this cannot concern or affect the dead individual you might argue, but it most certainly will affect the authenticity of actions whilst alive. So, the prospect of finitude or immortality will greatly influence the way an individual lives their life. This implicates the notion of ‘quality of life’, not in a Rousseauian sense of existing in a romantic natural utopia, but in a fundamental ontological sense. The transhuman entity has no urgency to act, no excitation to be creative, nor to act authentically, a somewhat similar ‘way of life’ to the Hindu sitting under a tree saying, "No need to do anything in this life, plenty more to come!" The inevitability of death for humans is an essential factor in living a life of quality, that is, a life worth the living. This is saying a similar thing to Heidegger in, "…anticipation [of death] utterly individualizes Dasein".28 This would surely be true whether a brain is made of ‘meat’ or silicone.

Immortality negates individuality and freedom. "Death is the limit, but also a constituent of freedom…If a being were endowed with temporal infinity, he could realize all his possibilities… he would disappear with respect both to individuality (the realization of some possibilities to the exclusion of others) and to freedom (dangerous and irremediable choice of certain possibilities)."29 The very thing an Extropian desires, to exist forever as an evolving, creative individual becomes a logical contradiction. As Simone de Beauvoir aptly points out, " Our lives would merge into universal indifference".30 As each transhuman entity experienced each possibility, the choice of which to choose from, coupled with the knowledge that they could not die, would gradually over time reduce all entities to identical clones.

One point to realise and for me it is difficult to imagine, is just how long is eternity? This is somewhat similar in trying to comprehend the time span involved when investigating human evolution on earth, yet this is a second compared with, forever! Once the transhuman entity realises it ( gender will be as changeable as the ‘virtual’ weather) is immortal, the freedom to act, to choose becomes inversely proportional to the length of the time the entity exists and makes such choices. As freedom to choose diminishes, so too does the individuality of the entity, a characteristic of the self-determining individual is the freedom to choose, for good or ill, the next action in furthering that individuality, in becoming.

Fortunately for Extropians their notion of immortality is misguided, in that the proposed length of their ‘immortal quest’ will always be a truncated version of the real thing. Just as the earth, our Sun and our galaxy will all eventually cease to exist, so too will the networks supporting the transhuman Extropians. This is good news for Extropians. Because immortality is not possible, Extropians will have an "anticipation of death" just like the mere mortals they evolved from, so it seems in principle, that Extropians may remain free self-determining individuals after all, at least in respect of the immortality difficulty.

In conclusion, we must remember the immortality question was discussed on the assumption that Uploading was a possibility, as I showed this appears not to be the case. Before we discuss the concept of Uploading further, perhaps we should create at the very least a rudimentary machine which displays Intentionality. And until such time as the body (human or cyborg) can be removed from its brain, and the brain survive and function, and until we understand what structures of that brain we could possibly Upload, Extropians will have to be content with a gradual transformation into earth-bound cyborgs. If ever it is possible to Upload the contents of a body-bound brain, the real essence of this Extropian exercise, is that whilst having some human attributes (perhaps language as an example) the new entity will cease to be human, and I contend it will not be the next step in human evolution but the creation of a new species, which may or may not treat other species as having intrinsic worth.

 

NOTES:

1 This document may be downloaded from the Internet at www.extropy.org More, M. The Extropian Principles. Version 3. A Transhuman Declaration.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Quoted in Kurzweil, R. The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence. New York. Viking, 1999.
5
Where Am I? Section 13. pp.217-229, see also Section 14 pp.232-241. in, Hofstadter, D.R. & Dennett, D.C. The Mind’s I. Fantasies & Reflections on Self & Soul. Harmondsworth. Penguin, 1982.
6
Austin, J. A. Zen and the Brain. Cambridge, MA.: MIT press, 1998.
Black, I. B. Information In The Brain: A Molecular Perspective. Cambridge, MA.: Bradford, MIT Press., 1991.
Chalmers, D.J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Damasio, Antonio. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. London: Papermac - Macmillan., 1996.
Hobson, J.A. The Dreaming Brain. New York: Basic, 1988.
Hobson, J.A. The Chemistry of Conscious States. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1994.
7
Ballard, D. H. An Introduction to Natural Computation. Cambridge, MA.: Bradford, MIT Press, 1997.
Clark, A. Being There: Putting Brain, Body and Mind Together Again, Cambridge, MA. Bradford Book, MIT Press.1997
Collins, H.M. Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1990.
Crane, T. The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical introduction to minds, machines and mental representation. London: Penguin, 1995.
Dennet, D. Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds, 1998.
Dyson, G. Darwin Among The Machines. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997.
Franklin, S. Artificial Minds. Cambridge, MA.: Bradford, MIT Press, 1995.
Gelernter, D. The Muse In The Machine: Computerizing the Poetry of Human Thought. New York: Free Press, Macmillan., 1994.
Gershenfeld, N.A. When Things Start to Think. Henry Holt & Co., 1999.
Hofstadter, D.R. Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought: Basic Books, Harper Collins., 1995.
Minsky, M. The Society of Mind. London: Heinemann, 1987.
Moravec, H. P. Robot: Mere Machine or Transcendent Mind: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Partridge, D. Artificial Intelligence and Software Engineering: Understanding the Promise of the Future: Amacom, 1998.
Searle, J.R. The Rediscovery Of The Mind. Cambridge MA.: MIT Press, 1992.
Searle, J.R. The Construction Of Social Reality. New York: Free Press, 1995.
Vinge, V. Vision-21. Symposium, NASA Lewis Research Centre & Ohio Aerospace Institute. 1993.
Weizenbaum, J. Computer Power and Human Reason. London: Penguin, 1976.
8
Thelen, E. & Smith, L.B. A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action. Cambridge, MA.: Bradford, MIT Press., 1994. See also other works by Thelen, E. et al.
9
Clark, A. op cit. p.xii
10
Clark, A. op. cit. see references throughout.
11
Damasio, A. op. cit. see references throughout.
12
Hobson, J.A. 1994. op. cit. see references throughout.
13
The COG team at MIT publish various documents outlining the procedures and progress regarding their artificial intelligence robotic creation COG. Brooks, R.A.(et al) Alternative Essences of Intelligence. COG Project. http://www.ai.mit.edu/COG/project
14
Hobson, J.A. 1994. op. cit. p.26.
15
Hobson, J.A. 1994. op. cit. pp.202-204.
16
Ibid.
17
Hobson, J.A. 1994 op. cit. pp14-16.
18
Ibid.
19
Gelernter, D. op.cit.
20
Searle, J.R. Intentionality: An essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. p.1.
21
Dreyfus, H.L. What Computers Can’t Do. The Limits of Artificial Intelligence. New York. Harper Colophon. 1979. pp.231-255.
22
Gray, C.H. The Cyborg Handbook. New York. Routledge, 1995.
23
Chang, K.Many Pentiums on a Grain of Sand. http://abcnews.go.com/sections/science
DailyNews/nanocomputer990715.html
24
Kurzweil, R. op. cit. p.135
25
Dennett, D.C. Brainchildren op.cit. See especially Section I & II
26
COG op. cit.
27
Cooper, D.E. Existentialism. Oxford. Basil Blackwell, 1990. pp.133-139.
28
Heidegger, M. Being and Time. Cited in Cooper, D.E. op. cit. p.136.
29
Sartre, J.P. Cahiers pour une Moral. Cited in Cooper, D.E. op. cit. p.134.
30
de Beauvoir S. The Prime of Life. Cited in Cooper, D.E. op.cit. p.135.

 

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